Análise da repressão penal no Brasil: entre o garantismo e a economia do crime

Abstract

This work aims to comprehend the Brazilian public security service by analyzing the consequences, for the efficiency of public institutions related to criminal prosecution, of adopting a legislative policy of penal expansion. The investigation adopted the theories of Penal Guarantees and Crime Economics as a theoretical framework. The study was carried out through methodological triangulation: bibliographic research in the literature review, in which the purpose of punishment was defined as a means of defending legal assets not protected by other legal systems; documentary research to prospect statistical police and judicial data, which led to the conclusion of a reduced efficiency rate measured by the number of crime reports effectively judged; qualitative research using the Delphi method, in which experts anonymously discussed elements surrounding the research hypothesis; interviews with representatives of agribusiness in which conducted to test the research hypothesis within the scope of penal protection for the environment. The public security system is selective, as it concentrates judgments on a few types of crimes, and of reduced effectiveness, measured by the ratio between the number of criminal behaviors reported to the Police and those judged within the Judiciary. The hypothesis of penal expansion as a factor of punitive inefficiency is corroborated by the research results, pointing to weakened and selective penal repression.